Thesis supervisor: Elisabeth CAMPAGNAC
By studying the introduction of forms of public-private partnerships in France and the deployment of financial actors around this subject, this thesis proposes to examine public-private partnerships (PPPs) in terms of the "financialization" of public procurement.
It draws on a variety of materials and fields of investigation (developments in public procurement law, influential literature, observation of actors and events promoting PPPs, interviews with financial stakeholders, internships in financial institutions linked to PPPs). In line with Bourdieu's study of the social structures of the economy, our approach consists of interpreting this varied material by conducting several levels of exploration within the field of economic sociology.
PPPs are first analyzed from the perspective of the social construction of a market. We propose ideal-typical, decontextualized organizational characteristics that allow us to classify as "PPPs" those public procurement arrangements that establish long-term global contracts (design, construction, maintenance) in which the public contracting authority benefits, in exchange for payment of rent, a service providing a building, equipment, or infrastructure to support the final public service. Legal certainty is added as a condition for existence.
This approach ties in with our longitudinal study of changes in the rules of law specific to the French context, which for a long time opposed the establishment of PPP-type contractual forms free of legal risks. The dismantling of an old rationality enshrined in administrative law is being replaced by a new rationality. Governed by regulatory mechanisms in line with the recommendations of New Public Management, PPPs reflect, through their intrinsic characteristics, the contributions of microeconomic theory on the optimal forms of public procurement. Competition for the market is combined with a governance architecture based on contracts, whose control function, provided by finance, is the cornerstone. This legal, historical, and conceptual interpretation of PPPs is reflected empirically in the mobilization and arguments of a coalition of public and private actors interested in the successful development of PPPs.
De facto, public-private partnerships open up a section of public procurement to the financial sector. The project financing technique implemented involves actors with divergent interests and timeframes. The financing mechanisms—arrangements and tools—are analyzed as a series of securitization operations, contributing to the division of public facilities into assets connected to financial markets and their requirements. The analysis of supply also focuses on the players – banks, investment funds, consultants – involved in PPPs, a field of actors whose division of labor dynamics are studied. At the end of this work, the project financing industry emerges as a new player in urban production and public services. Beyond our ambition to propose a sectoral study protocol contributing to the sociological analysis of financialization, this thesis sheds light on new challenges for public action.
Thesis defended on Thursday, November 7, 2013
Keywords: PPP, project financing, economic sociology, sociology of finance, social construction of markets, financialization, public procurement
Year of thesis registration: 2007
Doctoral school: OMI – Organizations, Markets, Institutions
Doctoral school: OMI – Organizations, Markets, Institutions