Housing production in France is at the heart of several academic debates: on government action, on private production logic, and on local governance. The thesis that a process of neoliberalization has been affecting Western societies since the 1970s offers a cross-cutting interpretation. However, analysis of a national housing policy instrument—tax incentives for rental investment—reveals its many limitations, particularly in the 2000s.
Based on a methodology combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, our research instead reveals the emergence of a new political economy of housing production. In connection with decentralization, public power has become dual, with the state regulating the market on the one hand and local authorities negotiating with private actors on the other. This duality also reveals contradictions between national issues (particularly macroeconomic ones) and local priorities.
At the same time, real estate development is changing: while the tax incentives put in place by the state have attracted new players and given rise to a specific production model, the new logic of public action is leading to a shift in strategies. The physical construction of cities is affected by these changes, both because national regulations have an impact on supply and because the unequal bargaining power of local authorities with private actors exposes small and medium-sized cities to a greater extent to housing production that is out of step with public expectations.
Thesis defended on January 7, 2013
Keywords:
Housing policy, rental investment, public action, neoliberalization, financialization, tax assistance, developers, public regulation
Doctoral school:
City, Transportation, and Territories